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Union Power and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline
Industry
by Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Zhentang Zhang*
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market
competition and union power.  The model has a two-stage setting in which wages are
determined through bargaining between management and unions in the first stage, with a
price-setting market game to follow in the second stage.  Using data for eight European
airlines from 1976-1994, we provide evidence on price-cost margins and the
measurement of market power in a model of rent sharing. In particular, we find that the
welfare effects of rent sharing work mainly through reducing firms’ profits, rather than
consumers surplus.  As a consequence the static impact of unions is more on equity
rather than efficiency.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Gewerkschaftsmacht und Produktmarkt-Wettbewerb: Evidenz aus der
Luftfahrtindustrie
In diesem Beitrag wird ein strukturiertes Modell spezifiziert und geschätzt, das den
Zusammenhang zwischen Produktmarkt-Wettbewerb und Gewerkschaftsmacht abbildet.
Das Modell ist zweistufig. In der ersten Stufe werden im Rahmen von Verhandlungen
zwischen Management und Gewerkschaften die Löhne bestimmt und auf der zweiten
Stufe folgt ein Preissetzungsspiel. Anhand von Daten für acht europäische Fluggesell-
schaften für die Zeit von 1976 bis 1994 läßt sich empirisch ein Zusammenhang zwischen
Preis-Kostenspanne und der Messung der Marktmacht in einem Modell des „rent
sharing“ feststellen. Dabei wird deutlich, daß sich Wohlfahrtseffekte des „rent sharing“
hauptsächlich durch eine Verringerung der Unternehmensgewinne ergeben und nicht so
sehr aus der Konsumentenrente. Daraus ergibt sich, daß der statische Einfluß der
Gewerkschaften auch mehr auf Gleichheit als auf mehr Effizienz abzielt.
                                                       
*  We would like to thank the seminar participants at LSE and INSEAD for their helpful comments.1. Introduction
Casual empiricism reveals that prices in the European airline industry have
traditionally been considerably higher than in other parts of the world, in particular in
relationship to North-America, for routes of roughly equivalent length.  One popular
explanation as to why that is the case is that European airlines have substantial
market power, either because of protected market niches or because of outright cartel
pricing practices.  In particular, it is argued that the bilateral agreements between
member states is an important device to implement collusive practices.  Such an
environment is commonly thought to have favored the exercise of market power by
individual carriers (see e.g. Seabright and McGowan, 1989).  In fact, the rationale for
the "liberalization" program in the European airline industry is based on the
presumption to end monopolies and bring prices down to "more competitive" level.
However, when measuring market power in the European airline industry one finds
little or no evidence that firms price above non-cooperative levels.  The standard
conjectural variations model yields pricing behavior that is consistent with Cournot
type conduct (see for example Good, Röller, and R.C. Sickles (1993b))1.  It is worth
emphasizing that the European studies are based on aggregate data, i.e. they do not
measure market power at the route level.  To the extent that there are significant
differences in the competitive conduct at the route-level, and that these
heterogeneities are not linear, aggregate models may not accurately measure market
power.
It is interesting to compare these findings to the estimated market power in the U.S.
airline industry, where route-specific data are more readily available.  Specifically in
the U.S. airline industry, market power has been studied by Brander and Zhang
(1990)2.  They conclude that the Cournot model is much more consistent with the data
in general than either Bertrand or cartel behavior.  Moreover, Brander and Zhang
(1993) estimate a switching regime model for the U.S. airline industry based on the
                                                       
1  Slightly higher market power is found in Röller and Sickles (1997).  However, a model of capacity
competition followed by price competition results in substantially lower levels of market power.
2  Other important contributions on pricing in the airline industry include Borenstein and Rose (1994)
who analyze price dispersion on a given flight.  The effect of networks on competition and pricing
are sudied in Brueckner, and Spiller (1991), and empirically tested in Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller
(1992).  Evans and Kessides (1994) investigate the ability to exercise market power in the airline
industry through multimarket contact.  They find that fares are higher on routes where the
competing carriers have inter-route contact.2
theory of repeated games.  They reject the constant behavior models in favor of
regime-switching models, where the punishment phases are best described by
Cournot competition.  A related strand of literature suggests that market power is quite
significant in the U.S. airline industry.  Hurdle et al. (1989) and Whinston and Collins
(1992) study the hypothesis of contestability of the U.S. airline industry.  Overall they
find that the airline market is not contestable and that excess profits are being earned.
In addition, Berry (1990, 1992) and Borenstein (1989, 1990) argue that airlines are
able to increase average prices through strong airport presence and hub dominance.
Overall the available evidence from Europe and the U.S. is thus that market power in
European markets is not substantially higher relative to the U.S. market.  In addition,
the available aggregate (non route-specific) evidence suggests that European carriers
do not exercise any collusive pricing practices - observed price costs margins are
consistent with a non-cooperative Nash behavior.  Given these findings, it appears
that one has to look elsewhere to explain the relatively high prices in Europe.
There have been several explanations as to why that is the case, all of which are
focused on high costs.  The first one relates to productive efficiency.  Whenever firms
are less efficient, low margins in the product market could be associated with
excessive costs that firms can afford because of a lack of competitive pressure, rather
than low prices.  In this case, prices would be high because costs are high, whereas
price-cost margins would be small.  Evidence regarding productive efficiency is given
in a number of studies (see for example Encaoua, (1991) and Good, et.al. (1993a)).
These comparisons between European carriers and U.S. carriers have shown that the
European carriers are less productive than U.S. carriers, with the relative efficiency
scores ranging from 50%-70%.
Excessive cost level can be associated either with productive inefficiencies (such that
European carriers use larger amounts of factors for given level of outputs relative to
US carriers), or with excessive factor prices.  Excessive factor prices is the topic of
this paper.  Indeed, firms which enjoy substantial market power may have a tendency
to pass on some of the rent they earn to the factors they use.  In particular, one can
expect that the personnel working for carriers with substantial market power will in be
a favorable position to bargain for wage increases.  Some evidence in favor of this
hypothesis has been provided by Seabright and McGowan (1989), who compare the
wages and labor productivity of European carriers to those found among US carriers.3
They find that European airlines pay a significant mark up over US rates for all
categories of personnel whereas their labor productivity tend to be lower.  It is the
second element of costs, i.e. rent-sharing, that this paper focuses on3.
More generally, in order to identify econometrically whether prices are high in Europe
because of high costs or collusive pricing practices one needs to develop a framework
that endogenizes costs and product market competition.  The mechanism that is
investigated in this paper is that of rent sharing between management and unions4.
To the extend that rent-sharing takes place in the European airline industry, market
power is underestimated through the evaluation of price-cost margins.  This, in turn,
will seriously complicate the tasks of competition policy authorities.  For example, the
observed prices in a market might be consistent with monopoly pricing, yet price-cost
margins are low.  To put it differently, prices in Europe are consistent with significant
market power, if one deflates costs by accounting for rent-sharing.  We will address
this claim in detail below.
The methodology proposed in this paper endogeneizes costs by explicitly taking into
account the link between product market competition and costs: market power and its
pass-through on costs are simultaneously estimated.  More specifically, we propose a
methodology to measure empirically the link between competition and rent sharing,
focusing on one potential channel, namely the settlement of excessive wages.  We
formalize airlines decisions as a two stage game, in which  wage settlement occurs in
the first stage and is modeled as a bargaining game between management and a
representative union.  At the second stage, the airlines decides on prices in the
market game.  We solve for the perfect equilibrium of this model.  We implement the
model empirically using data on European airlines for the period  1976-1990.
                                                       
3  Yet another explanation for higher costs might be that the technology used is different in the U.S.
than in Europe.  Productivity is usually decomposed into technical efficiency and technological
progress.  Nevertheless, to the extend that technological progress is not picked up by the efficiency
scores, there remains little empirical evidence that technological progress has been larger in the
U.S. relative to Europe (Good et al. 1993a).
4  There are other approaches to establish a link between competition and efficiency.  As shown by
Hart (1983), a competition in the product markets can indeed tighten the incentives constraints
faced by managers and reduce the scope for managerial slack.4
2.  A Model of Rent Sharing and Market Competition
In this section we specify a two-stage game in which a representative union bargains
with management over the wage rate in the first stage, with a price-setting product
differentiated market game to follow in stage two.  We assume that neither unions nor
management coordinate their bargaining behavior in stage one.  However, both
parties will take the product market game into account when bargaining takes place in
stage one.  In other words, the more profitable (rent) the product market game in
stage two, the higher the equilibrium wage which unions are able to extract from
management (holding bargaining power constant).  Higher wages, in turn, will lower
the rent in stage two which will reduce the ability by unions obtain higher wages.  In
equilibrium these two effects will offset each other.  In this sense the product market
outcome and the resulting cost function are simultaneously determined.
We begin by modeling demand in the European airline industry in the following
fashion,
q p p Z i i j i ( , , ),    i N =1,.., (1)
where N is the number of carriers (or countries), qi  is the quantity demanded,  pi  is a
price index for carrier i, and  pj  is a price index of the competitors prices.  Zi  is a
vector of country-specific, exogenous factors affecting demand.  The implicit duopoly
assumption in (1) can be justified by the existence of bilateral agreements.  While the
European carriers were engaged in moderate competition in Transatlantic travel, the
domestic scheduled market remained heavily regulated through bilateral agreements
until the mid-eighties.  The resulting duopolistic market structures created by the
bilateral agreements also prevented new entry in the intra-European market.














0. That is, the own-price effect is larger in absolute value than the cross-
price effect.
We specify the firm-level cost function as follows,
C q R i i i ( , , ) w (2)5
That is, total costs depend on quantity (qi ), the wage rate (wi ), and a vector of
exogenous cost characteristics Ri.
The structure of the game which firms and unions are engaged in is a two-stage set-
up. At stage 2, firms compete in the product market by choosing prices to maximize
profits, i.e. firms solve the following problem,
max (.) ( (.)| , )
pi
i i i i i i q p C q R p w = - i N =1,..,
where qi ( ) ￿  is given in (1).  Note that the wage rate is assumed to be exogenous at
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 is marginal cost
function. The firms behavior parameter q  can be interpreted as the degree of
coordination in a price-setting game. In particular, when q = 0, firms behavior is
consistent with that under a Bertrand-Nash pricing game.  In this case (3) reduces to
the well-known case in which firms price according to their own elasticities.  When
q < 0 , firms behave more competitive than Bertrand-Nash. On the other hand, when
q > 0 , firms behave more collusively than Bertrand-Nash.  In particular, cartel pricing is
associated with a q = 1.  Finally, as q ﬁ -¥ , price approaches marginal costs and the
market outcome can be categorized as perfectly competitive.
At stage 1, firms bargain with their respective unions over the total wage bill.  We
assume that the solution is characterized by a Nash bargaining outcome given by the
following program: 
( ) { } max ( )
w
d d w p
i
i i i L
1- , where d  is the degree of union bargaining
power and (1-d ) is the firms’ bargaining power.  Whenever d  is unity, unions have all
the bargaining power.  Conversely as d  close to zero, management has the maximum6
bargaining power.  The above Nash solution thus assumes that management
attempts to maximizepi , whereas unions like to achieve high wages.
There are two qualifications with the above set-up that are important to mention at this
point.  First, we assume that unions take employment as given and bargain only over
wages.  The main reason for doing this is to keep the model tractable.  However, we
believe that during the sample period under investigation this is not unrealistic.  Only
with the recent pressures from deregulation have unions and management begun to
explicitly reduce their wage demands in exchange for employment security.  The
second caveat is that we need to account for the subsidies which airlines receive from
their respective governments.  These subsidies, or more precisely the potential
subsidies, should be included in the "cake" which management and unions bargain
over.  In order to control for the subsidy effect, we assume that airlines are subsidized
to the extent that they are always bailed out by their government:  government are
prepared to ensure that the airlines do not exist.  Given these considerations, we
implement the presence of government by impose a zero profit constraint on pi .



















Let us denote the equilibrium prices defined by (3) as  pi i j ( , ) w w .  Substituting them

































Substituting them back into the first-order condition (4), we get,




































0   (5)
Note that the sequential strategic dependence of wage and price can be tested by
¶ ¶w ¶ ¶w p p i i j i / / „ „ 0 .  Rather than specifying specific functional forms, we use the7
structure of the model to solve explicitly for sequential strategic effects.  Implicit












































 and  H A B
p = -






























 are own and cross partial demand derivatives including the conjectural
variations, respectively.
Note that the conditions for the existence and stability of stage 2 equilibrium,  A < 0
and  H A B
p = - >
2 2 0, together with the condition of strategic complementarity,  B > 0,
imply that the own-sequential effect has the same sign but is greater than the cross-














> 0 is the effect of wages
on marginal costs in stage two.  This is an important parameter of the model, since
whenever it is zero there is no strategic link between the two periods.  The
significance of this parameter will be a testable hypothesis in the empirical section
below.
Before estimating the above model, we need to determine wages if there were no
unions.  By comparing wages obtained by unions to the wages determined by
marginal productivity of labor, we are able to assess the extend to which rent sharing
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 is firm i’s marginal product of labor; hii  and hij  are the own and
cross price elasticity of demand, respectively. By comparing the equilibrium wage and
prices given by equations (3) and (5) to those given by equations (3) and (7), we can
the extend of rent sharing.8
3.  Empirical Implementation
3.1 Functional Specification, Data and Estimation
The empirical implementation of the model in the above section involves
simultaneously estimating the demand equation (1), the two first-order condition (3)
and (5) subject to (6).  The endogenous variables are therefore prices, quantities, and
wages. The demand equation corresponding to (1) is specified as follows,
q p p GASOLINE GDP GCONS RAIL NETWORK i i j i i i i i i = + + + + + + + + a a a a a a a a e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 (8)
where e1i denotes the error term.  The exogenous variables influencing demand are:
an index of the price of all other airlines (Pj), an index of the price of gasoline
(GASOLINE), a measure of country size (GDP), a measure of economic activity -
consumption growth (GCONS), an index for the price of rail transportation (RAIL), and
a measure of the size of the carriers' network (NETWORK).  The data and their
construction are described in more detail in Appendix A.  Summary statistics of the
data are given in Table 1.
Regarding the cost function, we must specify the derivatives of (2).  The marginal cost
equation (¶ ¶ C qi / ) defined implicitly in (2) is assumed to be linear in wage, the price
indexes for capital and materials, as well as a variety of cost and quality
characteristics such as the load factor (LOADF), the stage length (STAGEL), the
percentage of wide-bodied planes in the fleet (PWIDEB), and the percentage of
turboprop planes (PTURBO). That is,
¶
¶
b bw b b b b b b
C
q
MC PK PM LOADF STAGEL PWIDEB PTURBO
i
i i i i i = = + + + + + + + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (9)













                                                       
5  The strategic complementarity condition  B > 0, and the second-order conditions  A < 0  and9
where e2i is the error term.
For the first-order condition for wage bargaining in stage one (5), note that under the
above functional specifications,  A = + 2 1 2 a qa  and B = -a2 .  Moreover, we can






= .  Substituting into (5), making use
of (6), we arrive at our empirical specification for the management-union bargaining
process,



























where MC is given by (9).  Using non-linear three stages, we estimate above system
of three equations (8), (10), and (11), where the endogeneous variables are given by
wages, prices and output.  The results are reported in Table 2.
3.2 Consistency Checks
Before interpreting the results, we perform several consistency checks on whether the
theoretical model is in line with the empirical estimates.  These tests can be thought of
as specification tests of having chosen the "right" structure for the data in hand.
Given that we have imposed a considerable amount of structure, there are a number
of conditions which need to be satisfied but have not been imposed ex ante.  The
purpose of this subsection is to investigate whether the "data reject the model".
As can be seen in Table 2, the demand estimates are in line with our maintained
assumptions.  Both the own-price elasticity (-0.887 ) and cross-price elasticity (0.331)
have the expected signs at sample mean.  In addition, our maintained assumption that
the own-price effect is larger in absolute value than the cross-price effect, is confirmed
by the data at each sample point6.
Also the estimates in Table 2 imply at all sample points that the partial own-demand
effect is negative (Di < 0) while the cross-demand effect is positive D j > 0, and the
partial own demand effect (at all sample points) is larger in absolute value than the
                                                       
H A B
p = - >
2 2 0 will be empirically tested below10
cross-demand effect, i.e. - > > D D i j 0. Moreover, the second order condition in stage
1 is satisfied, i.e. 
¶ w p
¶w
d d 2 1
2 0




<  (See Appendix 2), which guarantees the
existence of stage 1 equilibrium. The second order conditions (for both existence and
stability) in stage 2 are also satisfied, i.e.  A < 0 and  H A B
p = - >
2 2 0 (See Appendix 2).
In addition, the strategic complementarity condition is satisfied, i.e.  B > 0.  Finally the
effect of wage on marginal costs, ¶ ¶w MC i , is positive. As mentioned in the previous
section, this implies that the own-sequential effect (¶ ¶w pi i / ) is greater than the cross-
sequential strategic effect (¶ ¶w p j i / ) in absolute value than and that they have the
same sign.
In sum, the estimates in Table 2 are consistent with all the restrictions and maintained
assumptions of theoretical model developed above.
3.3 Interpretation of Parameters
We now interpret the results given in Table 2 in more detail.  The price elasticity of
demand is estimated at -0.887, which indicates an elasticity close to unity (in fact the
estimate is statistically not significantly different from one). The cross-price elasticity is
estimated at 0.331 (at the sample mean), which indicates that the services provided
by airlines are substitutes.
Many of the remaining parameters have the expected signs.  For the demand
equation, GDP, the price of railroad transportation, and the size of the network all
have positive and significant effects.  The price of gasoline has a negative and
significant effect on airline demand, indicating that automobiles and air travel are
complements.  This might be explained by the fact that gasoline prices are highly
correlated with fuel prices.  Consumption growth has a positive and significant effect
on demand for air travel.  The cost parameters have the expected signs as well.  The
price of capital and the price of materials are positively related to marginal costs.  In
addition, both the load factor and the length of stage lower marginal costs.  An
increase in wide-bodied planes lowers marginal costs, and more turboprop planes
                                                       
6  For example at the sample mean ,we have  - = > = ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ q p q p i i i j 182096240 67332284 . . .11
raise marginal costs.  Finally, the price of labor (wages) increases marginal costs.
Hence, rent sharing raises airline’s marginal costs by raising wages.
As mentioned earlier, the effect of wage on marginal costs, ¶ ¶w MC i , determines
whether the two-stage model can be reduced to a one-stage model.  Since this effect
is positive and significant (t-stat of 4.93), we reject a one-stage model in favor of the
two-stage specification.
Note that the estimated market power parameter q  is -.047 (t-stat of -0.35) in this two-
stage set-up. This implies that q  is insignificantly different from zero, that is, we
cannot reject Bertrand-Nash behavior in the product market.  Furthermore, the q  that
would correspond to Cournot-Nash conjectures for the linear model above can be
shown to be 0.37.  As can be seen in Table 2 we reject Cournot-Nash behavior with a
t-stat of -3.15.  Moreover, we reject cartel pricing behavior with a t-stat of -7.90.
Regarding competition in the product market, we can therefore conclude that the data
is consistent with a rather non-collusive environment.  In fact, we find conduct to be
consistent with Bertrand pricing, which is even more competitive than previous
estimates for European airlines.
Turning to the measurement of union power, it appears that there is strong evidence
suggesting that unions do have significant bargaining power with d  of 0.813 (t-stat of
33.88).  However, as we mention above, we need to compare this to the d  which








































Since we do not estimate productivity of labor in this paper, we have operationalized
(12) by using the estimate obtained by See Good, Nadiri, Röller and Sickles 1993.











= 0347 . *  is firm i’s
marginal product of labor.  Using this estimate and the estimates in Table 2 we jointly
calibrating the two first-order conditions (10) and (12).  This calibration exercise yields
                                                       









a d  of 0.712 which corresponds to the competitive labor market solution.  More
importantly, a test comparing the two d 's reveals that the estimated union power is
significantly higher than the competitive labor market solution (t-stat of 4.21.  This
implies that wages are higher and that rent sharing is significant.  In other words,
unions do have an impact.
In order to assess and quantify the effect of product market competition and union
power on the market outcome we have summarized various scenarios in Table 3:  the
level of wages, prices and mark-ups.  Focusing on the estimated product market
conduct (column one of Table 3) we compare the actual market scenario (top-left) to
that which would happen when unions have no power (corresponding to a  d  of
0.712).  As can be seen the effect of union power on wages is quite significant, raising
wages from 16.52 to 25.568.  However, the impact on price-cost margins as well as
prices is relatively small, with prices being increased from 1.72 to 1.77 due to unions.
This implies that the path-through effect of unions is mainly through fixed costs and
less through marginal costs and prices.  Moreover, this finding is robust across the
varies product market scenarios in Table 3 (compare across columns).  The impact of
unions is consistently the same:  mainly through wages, but less on prices and mark-
ups.  As expected, Cournot competition would imply significantly higher prices and
mark-ups.  However, as mentioned above, the estimated conduct in the product
market is not consistent with Cournot, but with Bertrand.
We are now in a position to evaluate the claim "prices in Europe are consistent with
significant market power, if one accounts for rent-sharing".  To investigate this
statement, we perform the following calibration of equations (10) and (11).  We hold
prices at observed levels (1.77) and reduce wages to their marginal productivity
(16.52).  In other words, we test whether observed prices are actually monopoly
prices, once costs are deflated to the level of competitive wage setting.  Using the
estimates in Table 2, we solve for the implied conduct parameter in the product
market.  The result is a q  of 0.170, which is still significantly less than Cournot
                                                       
8  It should be stated that the impact on wages due to union power might be overstated here because
we do not allow for labor to adjust when we calibrate the “without union power“ scenario in Table 3.
It is reasonable that employment might decrease due to wage reductions and that the marginal
productivity of labor would increase as a consequence.  This implies that the wage reduction due to
the loss of union power would be offset by an increase in marginal product of labor, leading to a
higher wage than 16.52.  However, most of our results below would be strengthened by including
this effect, except for the magnitude of rent-sharing which would be reduced accordingly.13
behavior, and consequently statistically inconsistent with monopoly pricing as well.
We therefore find no evidence to support the above claim.
Even though the impact of unions on prices is small, there is significant rent-sharing.
The amount of rent being transferred to labor can readily be calculated from Table 3
as Dwi i L * .  This amounts to some $242 million per carrier per year, which is a sizable
amount.  By comparison the average loss of the European carriers in our sample
period over 1976-1994 is approximately $157 million.  This implies that the rent being
shared more than offsets the average loss.
In sum, the above findings imply that the impact of unions is far from being
insignificant, however there is not much of an effect on consumer surplus.  In terms of
welfare the above results suggest that the effect of unions does not create much
allocative inefficiencies in the product market.  It appears that unions impact more on
equity than efficiency in this context.  However, since airlines are making losses, and
are being subsidized by their respective governments, one has to include the cost of
raising public funds.  In addition, rent-sharing of this magnitude might influence the
ability of firms to stay in business, thereby inducing excessive exit.  In this context,
rent-sharing might prevent the evolution of an efficient market structure.
4. Implications
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which links product market
competition and union power.  Our findings can be summarized as follows:
• product market competition is high and statistically consistent with Betrand
behavior.
• rent-sharing in European airlines is significant and its magnitude is sizable
• price cost margins and consumer surplus are less affected by rent-sharing
• observed prices in Europe are not consistent with cartel pricing, once rent-sharing
is accounted for
• the static impact of unions is more on equity rather than efficiency14
The above results imply that the impact of unions is a significant transfer from owners
of the firms to labor, while consumers are not being affected much.  This suggests
that unions do not have a welfare reducing effect.
However, there are other welfare considerations.  Given that there have been
significant subsidies by the respective governments (both explicit and implicit), in
effect the transfers have been from tax payers to labor.  As mentioned above, one
has to include the cost of raising public funds.  In addition, rent-sharing of this
magnitude might influence the ability of firms to stay in business, thereby inducing
excessive exit.  Moreover, entry barriers (for instance slot allocations to incumbents)
which might be partially created by governments, prevent efficient entry.  In this
context, rent-sharing might prevent the evolution of an efficient market structure,
which would benefit consumers.
Besides the market structure explanation just mentioned, the question of why prices in
Europe have been so much higher still remains.  Given that there is little evidence of
collusion, and given that the rent sharing arrangements in European airlines do not
provide much explanatory power either, it appear that the most reasonable
explanation is the relative lack of productive efficiency.  Understanding the precise
mechanism by which competition increases productive efficiency, and quantifying it
empirically, seems an important area for further research.15
Appendix A: Data Description, Sources and Construction
This study uses a panel of the eight largest European carriers - Air France, Alitalia,
British Airways, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, SABENA and SAS with annual data from
1976 through 1994.  The data can be organized into three broad categories:
production and cost data, network data and demand data.
Production and cost data:  The primary source for the production data is the Digest of
Statistics from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Good, Röller, and
Sickles [1993] constructed a set of three airline inputs: Labor, Materials and Aircraft
Fleet. The labor input is an aggregate of five separate categories of employment used
in the production of air travel. Included in these categories are all cockpit crew,
mechanics, ticketing, passenger handlers and other employees. Information on
annual expenditures and the number of employees in each of the above categories
were obtained from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Fleet and
Personnel Series.  These indices are aggregates of a number of sub components
using a Divisia multilateral index number procedure [Caves, Christensen and Diewert,
1982].
Expenditures on supplies, services, ground-based capital equipment, and landing
fees are combined into a single input aggregate called materials. It is not necessarily
true that the purchasing power of a dollar or its market exchange rate equivalent is the
same in all countries. Consequently we use the purchasing power parity exchange
rates constructed from Heston and Summers [1988]. These are adjusted by allowing
for changes in market exchange rates and changes in price levels. Use of airport
runways is constructed by using landing fee expenses and using aircraft departures
as the quantity deflator. The service price for owned ground based equipment is
constructed by using the original purchase price, 7 % depreciation and the carrier's
interest rate on long term debt.  Fuel expenses are given for each carrier in ICAO's
Financial Data Series.  Unfortunately, there are no quantity or price figures given in
that source.  There are two possible solutions.  The first is to estimate fuel
consumption for each aircraft type in the fleet, given the consumption of U.S. carriers
on similar equipment for the specific number of miles flown and adjusting for stage
length.  Alternatively, fuel prices for international traffic in several different regions is16
available through ICAO's Regional Differences in Fares and Costs.  The airline's fuel
price is then estimated as a weighted average of the domestic fuel price (weighted by
domestic available ton-kilometers), and regional prices (weighted by international
available ton-miles in the relevant region).  This method explicitly recognizes that for
international carriers not all fuel is purchased in the airline's home country.  As with
the labor input, these sub components are aggregated using a multilateral index
number procedure and are termed materials.
A very detailed description is available for aircraft fleets. These data include the total
number of aircraft, aircraft size, aircraft age, aircraft speed, and utilization rates. This
information is available over the course of a year from ICAO and a calendar year's
end inventory is available from IATA's World Air Transport Statistics. Asset values for
each of these aircraft types in half-time condition is obtained from Avmark, one of the
world's leading aircraft appraisers. This data source provides a more reasonable
measure of the value of the fleet since it varies with changing market conditions.
Jorgenson-Hall user prices for the fleet are constructed by using straight line
depreciation with a total asset life of 20 years and the relevant long term interest
rates.
Data on output (both services available and services provided) is obtained from
ICAO's Commercial Airline Traffic Series. They disaggregate airline output along
physical dimensions (classification into passenger output and cargo (classification into
available output and purchased output), along utilization dimensions, along functional
dimensions (classification into scheduled and non-scheduled output), and finally on
geographic dimensions (classification into domestic and international output). This
leads to 16 sub aggregations of airline output.
The revenues for the carriers are obtained from the - Digest of Statistics (Financial
Data - Commercial Air Carriers) from the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). Revenues are available for passenger, freight, mail and non-scheduled
output.  The price is calculated as a ratio of the carrier's passenger revenues
(including excess baggage) to passenger ton-kilometer miles performed.17
Network and Fleet Specific Data: The primary source for the network data is the World
Air Transport Statistics publication of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA).
Three characteristics of airline output and two characteristics of the capital stock are
calculated. These included load factor, stage length, a measure of network size, the
percent of the fleet which is wide bodied, and the percent of the fleet which uses
turboprop propulsion. Load factor provides a measure of service quality and is used
as a proxy for service competition. Stage length provides a measure of the length of
individual route segments in the carrier's network. The number of route kilometers
provides a measure of total network size.
Both the percent of the fleet which is wide bodied and the percent using turboprop
propulsion provide measures of the potential productivity of capital. The percent wide
bodied provides a measure of average equipment size. As more wide bodied aircraft
are used, resources for flight crews, passenger and aircraft handlers, landing slots,
etc. do not increase proportionately. The percent turboprops provide a measure of
aircraft speed. This type of aircraft flies at approximately one-third of the speed of jet
equipment. Consequently, providing service in these types of equipment requires
proportionately more flight crew resources than with jets.
Demand Data:  The demand data for the same period was collected for the respective
countries - France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and the
three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden, Norway.  The different data series
for Denmark, Sweden and Norway are weighted by their respective GDP's in order to
create single representative indices for the Scandinavian countries, which share the
majority of the equity in SAS.
The price of the "other" airlines (Pj) in the duopoly model is computed by weighting all
the individual prices by their respective revenue shares in the market.  Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) was obtained from the Main Economic Indicators publication
of the Economics and Statistics Department of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).  It is reported for the above countries, in
billions of dollars.  The OECD Economic Outlook publication, Historical Statistics is the
source of the growth in private consumption expenditure data. They are reported as
an implicit price index with year to year percentage changes. The annual short-term18
interest rates were also obtained from this publication. The rates are reported by the
respective countries on the basis of the following financial instruments: Belgium
(three-month Treasury certificates), Denmark (three-month interbank rate), France
(three-month Pibor), Germany (three-month Fibor), Italy (interbank sight deposits),
Netherlands (three-month Aibor), Norway (three-month Nibor), Spain (three-month
interbank loans), Sweden (three-month Treasury discount notes) and the United
Kingdom (three-month interbank loans).
Jane's World Railway is the source of the rail data. Rail traffic is reported in four
categories: passenger journeys, passenger tone-kilometers, freight net tone-
kilometers and freight tones. The three revenue categories are passengers and
baggage, freight, parcels and mail, and other income. To be consistent with the price
of air travel, the rail price was calculated as the ratio of passenger (and baggage)
revenue to passenger tone-kilometers.  We thank S. Perelman for making available to
us some of the more recent rail data which were not available in Jane's World
Railway.
The retail gasoline prices (prices plus taxes) were obtained from the OECD,
International Energy Agency's publication, Energy Prices and Taxes.19
Appendix B: Second-order conditions and strategic complementarity
condition
In this appendix we derive the second order conditions in stage 1 and 2 and also the
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For a linear demand function and constant marginal cost, the second order conditions




































 and  H A B
p = -
2 2 .














prices are strategic complements, i.e.  B > 0, as well as the existence and stability
condition in stage 2, i.e.  A < 0  and  H
p > 0.
At stage 1, denoting 
( ) U L i i i i =
- ( ) w p
d d 1 , for linear demand function and constant
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Therefore,  D < 0.20
Table 1.  Summary Statistics
Variable
Number of
Observations Mean Minimum Maximum
Pi 141 1.123 0.626 2.021
Qi 141 2304691.910 69085.130 8839172.470
wI 141 31.913 3.677 70.863
Pj 152 1.134 0.745 1.647
PK 141 1900.780 533.980 5800.890
PM 141 138.883 79.740 225.663
Li 141 26809.890 6277.000 54919.000
Ki 141 98.594 23.500 233.000
Mi 141 12924.570 2148.400 53386.780
GASOLINE 152 0.715 0.311 1.270
GDP 152 670.244 147.900 1766.300
GCONS 152 7.031 -0.900 23.700
RAIL 152 0.053 0.0143 0.136
NETWORK 152 446981.550 188787.000 1072390.000
LOADF 141 0.639 0.535 0.727
STAGEL 141 1.202 0.689 3.660
PWIDEB 141 0.234 0.080 0.529
PTURBO 141 0.029 0.000 0.195
For variable definitions see Appendix A.21
Table 2.  European Airlines - Two-Stage Game























(q = 0) (q= .370)
Behavioral Parameter
q -0.047 -0.35 -3.15
The estimates reported in the demand equation are converted into elasticities.
The t-statistic for d corresponds to the t-statistic on (d/(1-d)).  For number of
observations, see Table 1.22
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￿ ￿  is the price-cost
margin.23
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